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Abstract
This paper investigates the e ect of shifting taxes from labor income to
consumption on labor supply and the distribution of income in Germany.
We simulate stepwise increases in the value-added tax (VAT) rate, which
are compensated by revenue-neutral reductions in income-related taxes. We
di erentiate between the personal income tax (PIT) and social security con-
tributions (SSC). Based on a dual data base and a microsimulation model of
household labor supply behavior, we find a regressive impact of such a tax
shift in the short run. When accounting for labor supply adjustments, the
adverse distributional impact persists for PIT reductions, while the overall
e ects on inequality and progressivity become lower when payroll taxes are
reduced. This is partly due to increases in aggregate labor supply, resulting
from higher work incentives.
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1 Introduction
The appropriate choice between direct and indirect tax instruments has been sub-
ject to an extensive debate on their respective merits and disadvantages. Although
the question of the optimal mix is still open, there are reasons for a coexistence of
both forms of taxation, as they address the economic policy objectives of e ciency
and redistribution in di erent ways. Moreover, in the context of the need for fiscal
consolidation, consumption constitutes an attractive and reliable source for govern-
ment revenues as a stable tax base. In addition, shifting the tax burden from labor
to consumption, referred to as fiscal devaluation, is currently considered as an alter-
native to nominal devaluation in order to restore competitiveness in some euro area
countries (de Mooij and Keen, 2012; Koske, 2013).
The debate on possible consequences of a tax shift from income towards con-
sumption centers around two issues. First, according to standard economic theory,
such a tax shift might be favorable with respect to employment as a consequence
of lower marginal tax rates on labor income, implying higher incentives to take up
work. Second, higher consumption taxes are often associated with lower tax pro-
gressivity and higher levels of inequality. However, employment increases from a tax
shift may outweigh adverse distributional impacts. The degree to which there exists
a trade-o  between equity and e ciency in this context is an empirical question.
We provide an analysis for Germany to gauge the extent of this trade-o  and inves-
tigate whether a shift from income to consumption taxation can be justified in light
of positive labor supply e ects. Germany represents a particular interesting case
as the tax wedge on labor income is among the highest in industrialized countries
(OECD, 2014).
Despite the theoretical virtues of indirect taxes, the direct to indirect tax ratio
has been on the rise over the last decades, mostly due to increasing social secu-
rity contributions (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2010). Consequently, recent years have
witnessed a growing discussion on a heavier reliance on consumption taxes, such
as sales taxes and the Value Added Tax (VAT) (OECD, 2007, 2010). A concrete
policy implementation of such a tax cut cum base broadening was the 2007 VAT
increase in Germany, which was compensated by simultaneously cutting unemploy-
ment insurance contributions.1 This policy was explicitly motivated by increasing
work incentives and generating revenues at the same time. In the same spirit, in
1 The standard VAT rate was raised from 16% to 19%, while the total rate of unemployment
insurance contributions was lowered from 6.5% to 4.2%. This specific reform has been ex ante
investigated by Bach et al. (2006).
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2009, Hungary financed a five percentage point reduction in the employer Social
Security Contributions rate through a higher VAT. These policies followed the ar-
gumentation that the tax burden on labor in most OECD countries is too high and
implies disincentives for labor market participation. Moreover, payroll taxes consti-
tute a significant share of labor costs for employers (OECD, 2014). A shift away
from income and payroll taxes towards consumption taxes could therefore release
unused productive capacities by increasing labor supply and demand. Moreover, la-
bor constitutes the major tax base for generating revenues in most countries, which
might be questioned in light of a proper application of the Ability to Pay Princi-
ple. Broadening the tax base addresses this issue by treating all sources of income
equally. The distributional consequences of a tax shift are however unclear.
In this paper, we carry out microsimulations of several revenue-neutral policy
scenarios. We simulate a step-wise increase of the standard VAT rate of currently
19% in Germany, accompanied by a reduction in personal income taxes (PIT) or
social security contributions (SSC).2 We add to the existing literature by simulat-
ing a range of revenue-neutral reforms on both PIT and SSC, accounting for labor
supply responses at the same time. As the distributional analysis is di erentiated
along several socio-demographic dimensions, the results can help to design specifi-
cally targeted policies to compensate the potential losers from an increase in VAT
rates. For example, if pensioners are found to be worse o , it might be worth con-
sidering to split the additional revenue from the higher VAT on lowering payroll
taxes and raising old-age pensions. The analysis is carried out with the behavioral
microsimulation model IZA MOD (Lo¨ er et al., 2014a). Based on a representative
sample of the German population from the Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP)
and a detailed model of the German tax and transfer system, we are able to simu-
late changes in household budgets as well as adjustments in labor supply behavior.
As the information on household consumption in SOEP is insu cient, we impute
expenditures based on estimates from the German Sample Survey of Income and
Expenditures (EVS). Our empirical approach is related to the studies of Decoster
et al. (2009) and Bach et al. (2006), but di ers in several aspects. While the for-
mer study depicts only the static changes in household budgets ignoring behavioral
responses, the latter does not consider a revenue-neutral reform.
We find that both scenarios of reducing the direct tax burden, either lowering
2 There are two VAT rates in Germany. Apart from the standard rate of 19%, there is a reduced
rate of 7% applied on most food commodities, public transport, books, newspapers, journals,
entrance to cultural facilities and works of art. Moreover, medical, educational and financial
services as well as rents are fully exempted from the VAT.
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PIT or SSC, imply distinct distributional impacts. Due to its strongly progressive
design, a compensated reduction of personal income taxes leads to a higher level
of inequality. Low-income earners, pensioners and unemployed are found to be the
main losers from the policy. For payroll tax reductions, the adverse distributional
e ects are significantly less severe, because payroll taxes constitute a regressive tax
themselves. Taking into account behavioral adjustments, we find that the distribu-
tional impacts of the tax shift are weakened. For lowering the PIT level however,
a strongly regressive impact persists. Reducing payroll taxes seems particularly
promising, given their potential to raise work incentives. In these scenarios, some
households are able to compensate their losses through higher labor earnings. Be-
yond, our results suggest no systematic di erence between augmenting both VAT
rates or only the standard rate, which underlines the limited redistributional power
that is often attributed to a di erentiation of VAT rates.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the theory on labor
versus consumption taxation and the empirical evidence on tax shifts. Then, we
present related empirical findings on the macro and micro level. In Section 3, our
microsimulation approach and the underlying data base is presented. Furthermore,
our method to impute expenditures in an income data set is described in detail. In
the results section 4, the simulated labor supply reactions are presented first. Second,
a detailed distributional analysis identifies winners and losers from the reform. A
comparison of several aggregated measures of inequality and progressivity completes
the analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Background and Literature
2.1 Theory
Taxation a ects economic incentives and may therefore induce behavioral adjust-
ments for individuals, causing e ciency costs compared to a hypothetical situation
without taxes. As any feasible tax causes distortions, the theoretical question is how
to characterize the second-best setting that implies minimum e ciency losses, given
a fixed government revenue. Economic theory provides intuition for why a shift
from income to consumption taxation might be favorable in e ciency terms, i.e.,
promoting growth and employment. Within a static standard utility-maximization
framework, it can be shown that both taxes distort the individual decision between
consumption and leisure equivalently. An income tax reduces the net wage, while a
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consumption tax reduces the real value of net earnings. Under non-negative wage
and income elasticities of labor supply, both forms of taxation reduce work incen-
tives (Bargain et al., 2014). While only a fraction of the population is subject to
income taxation, virtually everyone pays consumption taxes. The consumption tax
base is hence broader, as it includes expenditures of pensioners, benefit-recipients
and capital-income earners. Hence, consumption taxes allow for obtaining the same
revenue with a lower rate. If one recalls the classic insight that the excess burden of
a tax rises approximately with the square of the tax rate (Auerbach, 1982), a shift
towards a consumption tax induces lower aggregate e ciency costs. The intuition
is that the positive e ect on labor supply from the higher net wage exceeds the
negative e ect from a lower real income, resulting in higher aggregate labor supply.
A theoretical counter-argument is that throughout the life-cycle, income nec-
essarily equals consumption and therefore implies an equal burden of both taxes
(Caspersen and Metcalf, 1993; Metcalf, 1994). However, this argument only holds if
both tax schedules are constant in the long run and if bequests are not considered.
Although the only di erence between (labor) income and consumption arises from
consumption smoothing, this intuition is hardly relevant in the policy debate on
what is understood as a regressive tax.3 Another argument refers to the treatment
of capital income. A tax levied on capital income distorts an individual’s saving
decision, as it implicitly taxes future consumption. If this is a normal good, an
income tax discourages savings. In contrast, the savings decision is neutral to the
level of consumption taxation, as the consumption tax does not alter the returns
to savings. Reducing the capital income tax in favor of the consumption tax is
therefore expected to increase savings and hence economic growth(Feldstein, 1978;
Auerbach and Hines, 2002).
The interdependencies between both forms of taxation have regularly been
addressed by the optimal taxation literature. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) were
the first to capture the equity-e ciency trade-o  of both taxes within a formal
framework. Under the assumption of separable preferences and individuals that are
inequality-neutral, they neglect any role for indirect taxation. Since all commodities
are equally substitutable for leisure, any attempt to o set the distortion between
labor and leisure is bound to cause e ciency losses.4 Later contributions refined this
argument by imposing more realistic assumptions and found commodity taxation to
3 For a treatment of lifetime inequality in a simulation context, see Creedy (1997). A recent
empirical analysis of lifetime inequality among German employees can be found in Bo¨nke et al.
(2015).
4 See also the argumentation by Sørensen (2007).
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be a necessary component of any optimal tax structure. Among these assumptions
are uncertainty about individual wages (Cremer and Gahvari, 1995), heterogeneity
among agents not only in ability (Cremer et al., 2001; Saez, 2002), di erent underly-
ing production technologies (Naito, 2007) or di erent evasion characteristics of both
taxes (Boadway et al., 1994; Richter and Boadway, 2005). According to Mankiw
et al. (2009), the advance of indirect taxes and VAT in particular can be attributed
to findings of optimal taxation theory. Despite Atkinson and Stiglitz’ wide-known
result not to levy any indirect taxes, it seems worth to consider whether a shift
to consumption taxation might adjust the direct to indirect tax mix towards the
optimum (European Commission, 2008).
A proper application of the Ability to Pay Principle might provide further
justification for a heavier reliance on consumption taxation. Such arguments favor
consumption (the use of income) to income (the contribution to national production)
as the better measure for individual ability (Gruber, 2011, chap. 25).5
2.2 Empirical Evidence
The e ciency impact of a shift from income to consumption taxation has been inves-
tigated by a number of empirical studies, most of them based on a macrosimulation
framework. They largely reveal positive, but moderate e ects from a compensated
SSC reduction on GDP growth rate and employment for the German case.6 All
studies suggest positive, but moderate employment e ects not higher than 1% of
total employment. Similar results are obtained for other countries.7 Unions’ be-
havior in the aftermath of the reform is found crucial for the long-run e ects of
the tax shift. Studies that explicitly incorporate the mode of wage bargaining draw
rather pessimistic conclusions. If unions’ bargaining power is assumed to be su -
ciently high, wage increases as a consequence of increased living costs become likely
in the medium term. Another channel that might work against the e ectiveness,
though not captured in these studies, are announcement e ects of VAT increases
that cause domestic demand to boost before and to decline in the aftermath of the
5 This idea dates as far back as to Thomas Hobbes: ”It is fairer to tax people on what they
extract from the economy, as roughly measured by their consumption, than to tax them on what
they produce for the economy, as roughly measured by their income.”(Gruber, 2011, p. 754)
6 See Buscher et al. (2001), Steiner (1996), Meinhardt and Zwiener (2005), Feil and Zika (2005),
Feil et al. (2006), Bo¨hringer et al. (2005).
7 See European Commission (2006, 2008) for a cut in income taxes in the EU as a whole, Altig
et al. (2001) for a shift of the US federal income tax, and Dahlby (2003) for income tax shifting in
Canada.
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policy change.
Macro approaches exhibit drawbacks when it comes to distributional questions.
Any conclusions derived from macro simulations do not account for heterogeneity
among individuals. As a consequence, these kinds of questions have been addressed
by a number of microsimulation studies which all focus on SSC reductions. Decoster
et al. (2009) provide a comprehensive study incorporating four European countries.
They simulate a 25% reduction in social security contributions, compensated by a
VAT increase. Their results indicate negative welfare e ects for households in low
income deciles, as well as for households with low-educated and unemployed heads.
This is in line with O’Donoghue et al. (2004), who find a general regressive impact
in twelve OECD countries, Portugal being most regressive and Belgium being nearly
proportional. Similar results are obtained by Bach et al. (2006), who simulate the
e ect of the three percentage points VAT increase implemented by the German
government in 2007. This was complemented by a cut in unemployment insurance
contributions by two percentage points. It should however be noted that this reform
was not revenue-neutral. Thomas and Picos-Sanchez (2015) simulate a revenue-
neutral shift of 5% of the SSC burden to VAT and find increasing work incentives
particularly for low-income earners across several European countries. Meinhardt
and Zwiener (2005) simulate a cut in SSC by two percentage points, combined with
an increase in VAT by the same amount. Although the authors do not report fiscal
e ects, this reform is presumably not revenue-neutral as well. They identify civil
servants, self-employed and unemployed as the main losers from the reform, while
gains for employed persons are rather moderate. A related study is provided by
Moscarola et al. (2015), who consider a shift of the tax base from labor to property,
while accounting for labor market reactions.
The empirical results partly strengthen the cause for a tax shift for e ciency
reasons, though the positive impact on employment and growth seems to be rather
moderate. As the results for Germany indicate, the magnitude crucially depends on
the institutional setting of the economy. The microsimulation studies presented here
confirm a regressive impact. Low-income groups are typically worse o  from a tax
shift as well as unemployed and pensioners. This result is not surprising, as these
groups typically face a low burden of income taxes and social security contributions.
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3 Empirical Approach
Microsimulation models have become a standard tool in the ex-ante assessment of
reforms of the tax-benefit system and therefore allow to trace changes in highly
complex tax regulations. In particular, the specific institutional setting and the
socio-economic structure in a given country need to be taken into account, which
can hardly be accomplished by an analysis on an aggregate level.
The basic idea of microsimulation in the context of labor supply is to model
the individual (or household) decision between leisure and consumption. Based on
observed behavior of a representative population sample in a given institutional set-
ting, preference parameters can be estimated. If net income (and thus consumption
possibilities) changes as a consequence of a tax-benefit reform, these estimates are
used to predict individual labor supply after the reform. The reform e ect is then
defined as the di erence in aggregate behavior between the two institutional regimes.
For this, a detailed representation of the tax-benefit system is necessary. We use
the IZA Policy SImulation MODel (IZA MOD) of the Institute for the Study of
Labor (Lo¨ er et al., 2014a). Apart from replicating the German tax and transfer
system, it comprises an econometrically estimated model of labor supply behavior.
It assumes a discrete choice set of working hours, which facilitates the treatment of
family labor supply. As our main database does not capture consumption expendi-
tures, we have to extend our database. This is done by an Engel curve procedure,
adopting the approach of Decoster et al. (2013).8
Reform Scenarios. We carry out simulations of two benchmark scenarios, in
which the standard VAT rate of 19% is increased in steps of one percentage point
each. For a given increase in the standard VAT rate d· > 0, we obtain the resulting
additional VAT revenue from total simulated revenues. We rely on simulated, not
o cial revenues for this, as our micro-data only capture consumption from private
households living in Germany and therefore cannot depict VAT payments from pub-
lic consumption, enterprises and foreigners.9 On the basis of revenue statistics, we
obtain the necessary proportional reduction on income-related taxes and apply this
factor to the simulated tax liabilities.10 This is done for personal income taxes and
8 Details on the data base, the imputation procedure and the underlying labor supply model
are provided in the Appendix.
9 We however correct the simulated revenue by the under-coverage of total private consumption
compared to national accounts, which amounts to 81% for the 2008 EVS.
10 There are numerous ways for governments to reduce the burden of income-related taxes. Here,
we refrain from discussing the various interdependent impacts of instruments, such as reducing
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social security contributions separately. This procedure is repeated eleven times
until in the last step, an increase in the standard VAT rate from 19% to 30% is
combined with a corresponding reduction on labor-related taxes. At the same time,
we provide more detailed results for a reference scenario with a standard rate of
25%. While this implies substantial tax shifts, secondary e ects, such as demand
for compensation by unions, are less likely to play a role than for even stronger tax
shifts.
Although SSC and income tax payments flow into separate budgets, their
impacts on the overall budget are highly interlinked. For many years, the German
statutory pension system has been partly financed through the tax budget, since
SSC revenues are not su cient to cover public pension payments. In fact, these
payments have become the largest share of federal expenses.11 For this reason,
reforms on either income taxes or SSC imply equivalent e ects for the public budget
as a whole. A VAT increase by six percentage points would result in additional VAT
revenue of e 29 bn, the corresponding relief amounting to 16.9% for the personal
income tax (total status quo revenues: e 174.6 bn) and 15.5% for social security
contributions (total status quo revenues from employees: e 190.5 bn).
Income concept. For each reform step, the combined tax change alters household
budget constraints which, in turn, induces adjustments in household labor supply if
the expected utility of an alternative choice category is higher than the status quo. In
order to account for the budget e ect of an increased consumption tax, the commonly
used concept of disposable income is not su cient here, as it ignores consumption
taxes. For the subsequent analysis, the quantity of interest will be Post-VAT Income
(PVI), which is defined as disposable income minus VAT expenses. PVI can be
understood as the amount of money that would be left for consumption after paying
the Value Added Tax. This income is of course virtual, as it is not disposable for
consumption after VAT has been paid. PVI is not only the basis for the distributional
analysis, but also enters the utility function and hence determines the labor supply
decision. We thereby implicitly assume that households have an identical perception
of their burden of direct and indirect taxes. This may be questioned in light of the
experimental studies by Sausgruber and Tyran (2005) and Blumkin et al. (2012),
marginal tax rates or raising the exemption level. Instead of providing a blueprint for a tax
reform, we rather aim at gaining a rough insight on the interaction between both forms of taxation
with respect to distributional questions. Therefore, we opt for the most straightforward way to
reduce taxes, namely by proportional reduction.
11 In 2009, e 102 bn of tax revenues (roughly one third of total revenues) were spent on financing
social security.
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both pointing to a lower perception of consumption taxes. If this is true, households
would ignore the VAT increase to some extent, implying a higher reaction from a
reduced direct tax. With positive elasticities of labor supply, our estimated labor
supply reaction should hence be understood as a lower bound.
Subtracting VAT expenses from disposable income is equivalent to full and
instantaneous VAT shifting from firms to consumers.12 We therefore abstract from
the fact that it may take time until firms shift the higher VAT to consumers, which
is in line with the logic of static models. Our expenditure imputation is also able to
depict the e ect on commodity demand through income and price changes.13 This
a ects savings behavior as well as adjustments in the expenditure structure across
commodity groups. As the level of basic social assistance in Germany is linked to
inflation rates, we address the importance of this particular channel on our results.14
Incidence and VAT di erentiation. Subtracting the revenue-neutral deduc-
tion from household income implicitly assumes that workers bear the full burden of
income taxes and social security contributions. Doubts are however justified, par-
ticularly for the case of payroll taxes, as their payment is split between employers
and employees.15 We address this issue by assuming alternative divisions of the
tax incidence in a robustness check. If the incidence is low, employees benefit less
from a tax reduction. We evaluate the extent to which this influences the overall
distributional impact of the reform.
In a further robustness check, we alter the benchmark scenarios by in-
creasing both VAT rates simultaneously, thereby addressing the issue of VAT
rate di erentiation. As in most OECD countries, expenditures for neces-
sities are taxed with a reduced rate in Germany. The common justifi-
cation for this policy are equity concerns. If the reduced rate is ful-
filling its redistributional objective, a simultaneous increase of both VAT
12 Full incidence of the German VAT in the medium run has been found by the Bundesbank
(2008).
13 See Appendix for details.
14 In practice, the level of the means-tested unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosengeld II ) is annu-
ally adjusted by the change of an index consisting of the price change in basic goods and services
(70%) and the average change in employees’ net wages (30%). As 54.3% of all expenditures are
subject to the standard VAT rate (see Table A.1), each percentage point of higher standard VAT
rate mechanically raises the price level and hence the unemployment benefit by 0.46 percentage
points.
15 The findings of Saez et al. (2012), exploiting a natural experiment in Greece, suggest that
for a payroll tax increase, the long-term burden of workers is limited to the employee share. It
is however unclear whether their findings are applicable for a di erent institutional setting and a
payroll tax reduction.
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rates should imply more regressive e ects than the benchmark scenar-
ios.
4 Results
4.1 Labor Supply E ects
Our microsimulation approach sheds light on whether the expectations of positive
e ects on work incentives can be confirmed. The labor supply e ects simulated
here have to be interpreted as medium-term outcomes, i. e., after households have
adjusted their labor supply behavior to the new institutional environment. If one
assumes a negative wage elasticity of labor demand, firms will react to higher labor
supply by lowering o ered wages, leading to an equilibrium outcome below the initial
labor supply shift (Peichl and Siegloch, 2012).
[Table 1 here]
The simulated labor supply responses, for an increase of the standard VAT
rate from 19% to 25%, are displayed in Table 1. It shows the aggregate change in
hours worked, measured in full-time equivalents (FTE) of 40 hours per week. The
total e ect is found to be positive in the order of 200,000 to 250,000 FTE for both
the PIT and the SSC reduction. This corresponds to an increase in labor supply by
around 0.5% of total employment. This is well in line with results obtained from
CGE studies (Buscher et al., 2001, p. 466; Bo¨hringer et al., 2005, pp. 95 ). Looking
at the extensive margin of labor supply, i.e., the number of individuals entering the
labor market from inactivity, we simulate an increase by 86,000 (PIT reduction)
and 124,000 (SSC reduction) workers respectively, indicating substantially higher
activating potential of lower social security contributions compared to lower PIT.
This is not surprising, as many workers with comparably low earnings are subject
to these contributions, while still exempted from the income tax. If the increase in
labor supply can be mostly realized, i.e., facing limited constraints on the demand
side, our simulation results confirm the theoretical expectations concerning a mod-
erate growth in total employment.16 In the results presented so far, unemployment
benefits are indexed by the inflation rate. The additional two columns in Table 1
16Microsimulation approaches with demand side restrictions are provided by Creedy and Dun-
can (2005) and Peichl and Siegloch (2012). In both studies, at least half of the supply e ect is
maintained.
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reveal that ignoring this channel would significantly overestimate potential labor
supply e ects. This holds particularly for the extensive margin (up to 1.5 times
higher labor supply e ect), as higher unemployment benefits reduce the price for
leisure and hence lower work incentives.
Aggregate labor supply e ects for di erent reform scenarios (i.e. di erent VAT
increases) are depicted in Figure 1. This sheds light on the interaction between both
taxes if the shift is smaller. Overall, the total hours e ect increases about linearly
for both scenarios, reaching 400,000 (PIT) and 330,000 (SSC) full-time equivalents
respectively. For the participation margin, e ects are substantial only after the
fourth reform step. Moreover, the labor supply e ect of the SSC reduction is stronger
than the PIT reduction across the whole range of reforms for the participation
margin. The inverse holds for the change in aggregate hours.
[Figure 1 here]
The total change in labor supply for the reference scenario is decomposed
by income deciles in Figure 2. It can be seen that the increase in hours worked
in the PIT scenario (dark gray bars) is mainly driven by higher income groups.
The participation e ect is even slightly negative up to the third decile, while most
workers entering the labor market are in the top deciles. These are mostly secondary
earners who have been previously inactive and now face a lower individual marginal
tax rate. Shifting from SSC a ects household budgets already at a lower income
level and exceeds the hours e ect from the PIT reduction in the bottom half of the
distribution, as indicated by the light gray bars. If policy-makers seek to reduce
entry barriers into the labor market by reducing the tax wedge, the SSC scenario
appears to be better targeted.
[Figure 2 here]
4.2 Distributional Impact
Employment Type. The average budget e ects with respect to the employment
type are illustrated in Figure 3.17 Employees experience modest income gains vis-
a`-vis the status quo (+4% in the short run, +5% when accounting for labor supply
changes). For other employment groups, the di erences between the scenarios with
and without behavioral adjustment are negligible. Pensioners lose most from the
17 Throughout the distributional analysis, incomes are adjusted by equivalence weights using
the modified OECD scale.
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reform, as they hardly benefit from reductions on the income side. Moreover, they
are not able to cushion the adverse budget e ect trough increased labor supply. For
self-employed and civil servants, the picture is mixed. On the one hand, these groups
significantly benefit from income tax reductions. However, they are not subject to
social security payments. For this reason, civil servants turn out to be slightly worse
o  from the SSC reform.18
[Figure 3 here]
With the exception of pensioners and civil servants, all employment groups
are able to compensate a large share of their losses through increased realized labor
supply. The main losers from the SSC reform are pensioners, who lose around 2%
on average. In relative terms, employees and unemployed workers are the main ben-
eficiaries. The average budget e ect for unemployed (+2% and +4% respectively for
the SSC reduction) is due to substantial increases for some unemployed. For those
remaining unemployed the total change in PVI will be about zero, as the increase in
VAT expenses is expected to correspond roughly to the increase in unemployment
benefits due to indexation. In general, these results are in line with expectations as
well. Those who are not a ected by the tax that is reduced are, in tendency, worse
o  from the reform.
Income deciles. The distributional impact along the reform path, di erentiated
by (status quo) deciles of Post-VAT-Income, is illustrated in the upper part of Figure
4. It displays the relative income change due to the reform by income deciles. For
a clearer exposition, we restrict the presentation to five selected deciles.
[Figure 4 here]
The upper panel of Figure 4 demonstrates the increasingly regressive impact
of a shift from personal income tax to VAT. Minor VAT increases hardly a ect
budgets of medium-income earners, but rather let the high-income earners better
o . After the final reform step (standard VAT rate of 30%), the lowest decile su ers
from an income loss of around 4%, while the top decile gains more than 8%. This
is in principle not surprising as one would typically expect those households to lose
from a shift towards consumption taxation who bear a low burden of PIT prior to
the reform. The higher saving ratio of high-income earners exacerbates this e ect.
18 The slightly positive budget e ect for self-employed is purely due to changes in spouses’
income, which cause equivalence-weighted household income to change.
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The core interest of our investigation is to analyze to what extent the regressive
impact is weakened if behavioral responses are accounted for. As the right panel
shows, the distributional picture however hardly changes for the PIT scenario, if we
consider the budget changes after the labor supply response. The improvement to
the first-round e ect is one percentage point at most across income deciles, leaving
the poorest decile 4% worse o  compared to the baseline.
The equivalent analysis is presented in the lower panel of Figure 4 for the
SSC reduction. While still implying a regressive impact in the short run, income
gains are not larger than 1.5%. The bottom decile loses around 2% on average.
Besides, the 7th decile experiences larger gains than the 10th income decile. This
can be explained by a low marginal payroll tax burden for top-earners due to the
assessment threshold and a decreasing income share of labor earnings for this group.
The labor supply response causes the picture to change to some extent by raising
the income e ects for all deciles. Middle income groups gain relatively more than
the highest income decile. The SSC reductions shift taxes from one regressive form
of taxation to the other, which clearly has lower adverse distributional e ects than
the income tax reduction. As the burden of SSC is more dispersed over the income
distribution, the budget changes from the reform are less pronounced for the second
scenario.
Summing up, a shift from labor to consumption taxation indeed exhibits a
regressive impact on household budgets. Lower income groups loose while receivers
of high incomes benefit, in tendency, from the reform. This can be easily explained
by the fact that the bottom 50% of the income distribution account only for 5% of
total income tax revenues and thus hardly benefit from a reduction. The regressive
impact is substantially less severe for a shift from social security contributions to
VAT. Hence, reforming the personal income tax as suggested here is likely to be
confronted with strong political opposition and is therefore not a realistic policy
proposal. As a consequence, the in-depth analysis in Section 4.3 concentrates on
the SSC reductions as the more attractive option for policy-makers.
Tax Progressivity and Inequality. To complete the picture on the distribu-
tional impact of the reform, Table 2 shows results for the degree of tax progressivity
for di erent components of the tax-benefit system. We analyze two measures of tax
progressivity. The Suits index fiSuits builds on the Lorenz curve for tax payments.
Let LX(p) and LT (p) denote the Lorenz curves for pre-tax incomes and tax liabilities
13
respectively. Then the Suits index fiSuits is obtained by
fiSuits = 2
⁄ 1
0
[LX(p)≠ LT (p)]LÕX(p)dp (1)
If fiSuits is calculated for some parts of the tax-benefit system (as in Table 2), the
index for the overall progressivity is a weighted average of the partial indices, with
average tax rate as weights (Suits, 1977). The index takes values in the [-1;1] in-
terval and is an indicator for the progressivity of the tax schedule. A value of 1
would imply an extremely progressive system where only one individual would be
subject to the tax. Opposed to this, the Reynold-Smolensky index fiRS captures the
redistributional impact of a particular tax by the di erence in pre- and post-tax
income concentration.
fiRS = 2
⁄ 1
0
[LX≠T (p)≠ LX(p)]dp = GiniPreTax ≠GiniPostTax (2)
The di erence of both indices can be illustrated by the following example. A strongly
progressive tax schedule (as measured by fiSuits) only exerts a redistributive impact
if high marginal tax rates are paid by a significant number of taxpayers (captured by
fiRS). Similarly to fiSuits, fiRS can be decomposed into the relative contributions of
certain elements of the tax system (Lambert, 2001). For both concepts, a progressive
(regressive) tax is associated with a negative (positive) value.
[Table 2 here]
In the status quo, fiSuits for VAT amounts to -0.194, while it is 0.346 for the
personal income tax. Hence, the Value-Added Tax is about half as regressive as the
income tax schedule is progressive.19 At the same time, the distributional impact of
VAT as measured by fiRS is regressive (-0.012), but only a quarter compared to the
PIT progressivity (0.049). The PIT reduction does not a ect the progressivity of the
tax tari , but reduces redistribution via the income tax. It is also apparent that both
reforms make the VAT schedule more regressive in distributive terms. The Reynold-
Smolenksy measure for VAT is only slightly higher than for SSC. This explains why
the SSC reform is close to neutral in terms of total progressivity ( fiSuits = ≠2.7%)
and redistribution ( fiRS = ≠2.6%).
[Figure 5 here]
19 See Decoster et al. (2010) for other countries.
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The baseline Gini for our income concepts amounts to 0.303. For the reference
scenario, it increases by 0.013 for the PIT reform after Labor Supply. For the SSC
reform, the Gini index increases by only 0.001, leaving inequality nearly unchanged.
The percentage changes for four basic inequality and progressivity measures are
depicted in Figure 5 for each intermediate reform step. The Gini index rises by
about 8% for the full PIT reform and around 1% for the SSC reform. The P90/P10
ratio (upper right panel) however shows a significant increase also for the SSC reform,
suggesting higher income polarization.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Alternative payroll tax incidence. We deviate from the benchmark SSC re-
duction scenario by altering the assumption of full incidence of the payroll tax. This
implies that the total payroll tax reduction falls on employees. Instead, we present
changes in aggregate distributional measures in Figure 6 for payroll tax incidence
values of 100%, 75%, 50%, 25% and 0% respectively. As labor demand is typically
estimated to be more elastic than labor supply (Lichter et al., 2014), an incidence
share of more than 50% for employees seems most realistic. Incidence below 100%
causes employees to gain less from a payroll tax reduction and hence weakens the
positive e ect on work incentives. For the extreme case of no incidence, we simply
raise only the Value Added Tax.
[Figure 6 here]
As expected, the labor supply response is weaker if the net wage is less af-
fected by the payroll tax change (left panel of Figure 6). For an incidence of 25% or
less, aggregate labor supply even decreases for all scenarios. The right panel depicts
the corresponding changes of various measures of inequality and tax progressivity,
the left bar representing the benchmark scenario of 100%. While the Gini index is
higher for lower incidence, income polarization, measured by the P90/P10 share, de-
creases. The intuition is that earners of higher incomes are losing disproportionately
if tax incidence is lower. Tax regressivity is increasing steadily as assumed incidence
decreases; the overall redistribution of the tax system does not vary much for dif-
ferent incidence values. For the most realistic range of 50% and above, our main
conclusions with regard to the overall inequality impact however remain una ected.
The Suits index indicates a steadily increasing overall regressivity. Interest-
ingly, the P90/P10 measure slightly decreases for lower tax incidence, suggesting
slightly lower income polarization.
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Increasing both VAT rates. So far, our reform scenarios left the reduced VAT
rate of 7% unchanged. Levying reduced VAT rates on necessities is justified, among
others, by equity considerations. As a consequence, all EU countries with the excep-
tion of Denmark impose di erentiated VAT rates. Nonetheless, VAT di erentiation
is often criticized for not achieving its social purpose (OECD/Korea Institute of
Public Finance, 2014) and to distort consumers’ choices. In the following, we ad-
dress the question whether shifting the tax burden also on commodities that are
taxed at a lower rate is particularly to the detriment of low-income earners. We al-
ter the SSC reduction scenario such that in each reform step, we increase both rates
simultaneously in steps of one percentage point. A VAT structure with rates of 23%
and 11% (Status Quo: 19% and 7%) is comparable with the reference scenario with
regard to the revenue e ect. It is important to note that the zero-rate commodities
remain exempted.
[Figure 7 here]
The distributional outcome of this reform is depicted in Figure 7, contrasted
with the reference scenario for the SSC reform. As there is virtually no di erence
in the income changes both in the short and medium run, it is fair to conclude
that raising both VAT rates instead of the standard rate does not imply a dis-
tinct distributional impact. This suggests that the reduced VAT rate in Germany
hardly achieves its redistributional purpose. The intuition is given in Figure 8.
Reduced-rate commodities account for about the same expenditure share across
income groups. A further policy proposal often discussed is the introduction of a
uniform VAT rate. If the VAT-exempted commodities are left untouched, one would
expect (qualitatively) very similar distributional e ects of this reform as in Figure 7.
[Figure 8 here]
5 Conclusions
This paper examines a partial shift of taxation from labor income to consumption
in Germany. Our empirical approach combines a detailed analysis of changes in
household budgets with a microsimulation of behavioral reactions on the labor mar-
ket. Based on a dual data base, we carry out a microsimulation of several reform
scenarios shifting a substantial share of personal income taxes or social security
contributions onto the Value Added Tax. The policies are designed revenue-neutral.
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The expectations of positive e ects on household work incentives are confirmed
by the simulation. The total increase in labor supply for the reference scenario
(Standard VAT rate of 25%) is expected to be rather moderate below 1% of total
employment for the benchmark scenarios. This suggests a limited capacity of this
policy instrument for targeting workers at the margin to enter employment.
The distributional evidence suggests that a shift from personal income tax to
VAT has a regressive impact on household budgets. Negative e ects are expected for
low-income households, unemployed and pensioners in particular. This budget loss
amounts to up to 4% of equivalized income, whereas the policy clearly favors high-
income earners. The change in aggregate distributional measures supports this view
by indicating higher inequality and a lower degree of the overall tax progressivity.
Typically, most losers have a low burden of direct taxes and thus hardly benefit
from a reduction on the income side.
Taking into consideration labor supply e ects, the overall picture slightly
improves for the SSC reduction, as income e ects turn positive for the majority
of people. This is for two reasons. First, SSC are a regressive form of taxation
themselves. Replacing them with another regressive form of taxation hardly alters
its distributional impact. Second, SSC reductions a ect household budgets at a
rather low income level, which bears activating potential. Reducing social security
contributions overall entails lower inequality increases than a shift from personal
income taxes. Besides, we demonstrate the negligible redistributive impact of the
reduced VAT rate. It is worth noting that our static approach does not allow
conclusions beyond the medium run. It is possible that positive employment e ects
vanish in the long run if unions are able to assert higher wages.
Our empirical results may serve as a point of departure for further research
in several areas. First, it is worth considering possible extensions of the policy
proposal in order to increase both political feasibility and e ectiveness with regard
to increasing work incentives for low-income groups (Thomas and Picos-Sanchez,
2015). One could think of a reform that is both revenue- and inequality-neutral. As
Decoster et al. (2010) suggest, increasing the progressivity of the remaining income
tax schedule is one option. Another way would be to compensate the main losers
by raising old-age pensions. Our results suggest that designing such a reform is
very well possible. In order to get a broader picture of the overall distribution
of the consumption tax burden, incorporating excise taxes seems promising. A
shift towards taxes on fuel or electricity is regularly discussed in the context of
environmental tax reforms that aim at internalizing external e ects.
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Figure 1: Labor Supply E ects for di erent VAT rate increases
−100
0
100
200
300
400
500
in 
10
00
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Standard VAT rate
PIT SSC
Full−Time Equivalents
−100
0
100
200
300
in 
10
00
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Standard VAT rate
PIT SSC
Participation
Own calculations with IZA MOD v.3.0.4. Full-Time Equivalent = 40 hours per week. The
vertical line indicates the reference scenario that displayed in Table 1.
Figure 2: Labor Supply E ects by Income Deciles (VAT rate of 25%)
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Own calculations with IZA MOD v.3.0.4. Income deciles are based on equivalized Post-VAT
income. Full-Time Equivalent = 40 hours per week.
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Figure 3: Income change by employment type
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line indicates the reference scenario.
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Figure 4: Income change by income deciles
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Figure 5: Changes in Inequality and Tax progressivity
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Figure 6: Alternative Incidence Assumptions
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Figure 7: Distributional impact of raising both VAT rates for the reference scenario
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Own calculations with IZA MOD v.3.0.4. The standard rate scenario corresponds to the
baseline SSC reduction with a standard VAT rate of 25%, the second scenario applies a
standard rate of 23% and a reduced rate of 11%, while reducing SSC. Income changes refer
to equivalized Post-VAT income. First-Round E ects refer to the situation without labor
supply reactions.
Figure 8: VAT Tax Rates over Income Deciles
Source: EVS 2008. Income deciles for equivalized disposable income. Each bar shows mean
values of expenditures shares by the respective VAT rate applied.
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Table 1: Labor Supply E ects (Standard VAT rate of 25%)
Reform Scenario Base PIT Reduction SSC Reduction
with UB
indexation
no UB
indexation
with UB
indexation
no UB
indexation
in thousands
Full-Time Equivalents 38,039 242.9 286.3 207.9 249.9
Participation 40,344 86.3 125.3 123.7 161.6
Own calculations with IZA MOD v.3.0.4. Full-Time Equivalent = 40 hours per week.
Table 2: Progressivity of Di erent Taxes
Reference
Scenario
Total PIT SSC VAT
Base
fiSuits 0.218 0.346 -0.060 -0.194
fiRS 0.076 0.049 -0.007 -0.012
Reform 1: PIT Reduction
fiSuits 0.185 0.345 -0.058 -0.188
fiRS 0.063 0.040 -0.007 -0.014
Reform 2: SSC Reduction
fiSuits 0.212 0.345 -0.059 -0.192
fiRS 0.074 0.049 -0.005 -0.015
Own calculations with IZA MOD v.3.0.4. Reform e ects after Labor Supply adjustment
for VAT standard rate of 25%. All reforms with indexation of basic unemployment benefit.
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A Appendix
A.1 Dual Database
The main database for IZA MOD is the German Socio-Economic Panel Study
(SOEP), which is an annual panel study of households and individuals that was
launched in 1984 as a representative cross-section of the population living in pri-
vate households in Germany (Wagner et al., 2007).20 Since then, the scope and size
of the panel has been steadily extended. Special attention is given to the repre-
sentativeness of the German population by explicitly oversampling foreigners and
high-income households. As of now, it covers around 22,000 persons living in more
than 12,000 households. Among others, IZA MOD exploits information on gross
wages, household composition, working time, age and educational background of
household members, as well as employment status and housing costs. These data
serve as input for the tax and benefit module and for the labor supply estimation.
The 2010 SOEP wave is delivered with information on household consumption.
The survey design implies non-response and heaping of values, which are dealt with
by correction methods described in Marcus et al. (2013). However, the consumption
categories do not cover all aspects of household expenditure, which justifies the ad-
ditional e ort of imputing information from an auxiliary source, namely the German
Sample Survey of Income and Expenditure (Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe,
EVS).21 It is a cross-sectional survey conducted by the Federal Statistical O ce
that started in 1962/1963 and is repeated every five years. The most recent avail-
able wave was conducted in 2008.22 It covers about 55,000 households, of which a
80% subsample is provided for scientific analyses (44,088 observations). The EVS
data contain detailed information on every household member’s employment, in-
come from di erent sources and assets. Its main focus rests on expenditures for all
types of commodities and services. All participants constantly keep record of their
expenditures throughout a three-month period.
Although EVS and SOEP apply similar concepts of household and household
income, both data sets are not fully comparable due to methodological di erences.23
20 In particular, we use version 29 of the Socio-Economic Panel data for years 1984–2012, doi:
10.5684/soep.v29. We rely on data from the 2009 wave only.
21Non-covered items include vehicle purchases, home appliances and telephone costs.
22 See Destatis (2013) for a detailed description of the methodology. EVS has been part of
the European Household Budget Survey until 1998. It was then replaced by the another survey
(Laufende Wirtschaftsrechnungen, LWR) which is carried out annually, but with a much smaller
sample.
23 See Becker et al. (2003) for further information on the comparability of EVS and SOEP.
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Income is reported in more detail in the EVS. On the other hand, it shows weaknesses
with respect to representing foreigners and high-income earners accurately. EVS
does not sample households above a monthly gross income threshold of e 18,000.
In addition, middle-income groups are slightly over-represented. The measurement
error is probably larger in SOEP than in EVS, due to the retrospective methodology
of the SOEP.
A.2 Imputation of Expenditures
Major tax shifts, as analyzed in this paper, are expected not only to a ect household
budgets, but also to assert substantial price changes. To capture the e ect on house-
hold consumption, the first-best approach would be to fully characterize household
consumer behavior by estimating a demand system (Banks et al., 1997). This is
unfortunately not possible based on one cross-section due to lack of price variation.
We hence follow a middle-path by estimating Engel curve relationships in a first
step, with the aim to reproduce the expenditure patterns observed in EVS in the
SOEP data. In a second step, we incorporate externally estimated price elasticities.
For the imputation of expenditures, we adopt the approach by Decoster et al.
(2013), who carry out a parametric estimation of Engel curves. This approach is
briefly outlined in the following.24 A similar approach has recently been applied by
Savage and Callan (2015).
As the EVS is based on quarterly, rather than annual data, significant singular
purchases may bias the picture by yielding inappropriately high expenditure values.
For this reason, we clear the EVS from households with negative disposable income.
Furthermore, we drop observations where either the statistical di erence between
income and expenditures or the amount of durable expenditures exceeds twice the
disposable income. In total, less than 1% of observations are excluded, leaving us
with a sample of 43,632 households.
We classify expenditures into 16 categories; 15 non-durables and one category
for durable consumption goods.25 Durable expenditures require special treatment,
24The main di erence to Decoster et al. (2013) is that they impute expenditures into the German
EU-SILC data, which is distinct from SOEP. We do not have any reason to believe that the
imputation quality should be much di erent when applied to SOEP, as both data sets are a
comprehensive samples of the same population. Apart from that, we employ further household
covariates, such as the flat size. We also do not estimate a probit model for durable commodities
first, as for our choice of cells, we are left with a negligible number of zero durable expenditures.
Finally, we use a tobit specification for the four expenditure groups with many zero observations.
25 The 15 nondurable commodity classes are mostly in line with the COICOP classifications (UN,
2012). Deviations occur for household services, which encompasses items from housing (COICOP
4) and household maintenance (COICOP 5). They are defined as follows: Food and non-alcoholic
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as their purchase may not be observed in the three-month window, while the actual
consumption stream persists from previous periods. For this reason, we distribute
total durable expenditures equally among households with identical cells, defined by
seven income groups, seven age cohorts and four household types.26 Afterwards, two
Engel curves for the total of durable and non-durable consumption are estimated.27
ln cji = –j + —j ln yi + “j ln(y2i ) + ”jXi + Áji (A.1)
where j is durable or nondurable total expenditure and yi denotes households dis-
posable income, Xi is a vector of households characteristics contained in both data
sets, such as flat size, community size, number of children in several age groups,
number of working household members and geographical region. Further covariates
reflect characteristics of the household head, namely age, age squared, sex, educa-
tion and employment status. We further include an interaction term between yi
and household size. Note that this framework explicitly allows negative savings, as
the sum for durable and nondurable expenditures may exceed yi. Based on these
estimates, the total amount of durable and nondurable expenditure can be predicted
for SOEP households. As the dependent variable in Equation (A.1) is in logs, the
prediction bias needs to be corrected.
In a second step, we regress 15 nondurable expenditure shares on the log and
log squared of total nondurable consumption. This functional form is regularly used
for estimating commodity demand systems. Four nondurable categories (tobacco,
rents, public transport and education) exhibit a substantial share of zero expendi-
tures, which needs to be accounted for. We therefore fit a tobit model for these
k = (1, . . . , 4) categories.
Êúki = –k + —k ln cndi + “k ln(cndi )2 + ”kXi + Áki (A.2)
Êki = max(0,Êúki) (A.3)
The remaining l = (1, · · · , 11) shares are estimated by unrestricted OLS using
cresti as total expenditures. This is defined as total nondurable expenditures from
these 11 categories: cresti = cndi ≠
q4
j=1 cj. This secures that predicted shares sum up
beverages; alcoholic beverages; tobacco; clothes and shoes; home fuels and electricity; rents; house-
hold services; health; private transport; public transport; communication; recreation and culture;
education; restaurants and hotels; other expenditures. Durable consumption entails, among others,
expenditures on furniture, home appliances, means of transport and household entertainment.
26This approach follows Beznoska and Ochmann (2013). Income and age groups are defined
by quantiles within household types. The mean number of observations per cell is 324, with a
minimum of 17.
27 All estimations are carried out using sample weights; monetary amounts are in monthly terms.
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to one.
Êli = –l + —l ln cresti + “l ln(cresti )2 + ”lXi + Áli (A.4)
Based on these estimates, the 15 nondurable consumption shares ‰Êmi,m =
(1, . . . , 15) can be predicted based on imputed total amounts ‰cndi and ‰cresti . For the
tobit models, we predict the unconditional expenditure and assign a lower limit of
zero. For the standard OLS estimates, negative predicted values occur in few cases.
These amount however to single-digit values and are set to zero. The remaining
expenditures are then corrected such that they sum up to one.
The accuracy of the matching procedure is evaluated in Figure A.1, comparing
the mean expenditure share for each of the 16 categories, separately for four types of
household composition (Single, Single Parents, Couples, Families with children). As
can be seen, the major expenditure items are durable commodities, food and drinks,
rents and culture and recreation. All observed expenditure shares are replicated in
SOEP with minor deviations not exceeding two percentage points. Rents are the
only group with larger deviations. This is however a minor issue for the accuracy of
the imputed VAT burden, as the average VAT rate for this particular group is only
3.7%. One problem with our procedure may arise for top-income earners, as there
are none in EVS (see Section A.1). As a consequence, their imputed VAT burden
might be wrong if their expenditure behavior cannot be described by extrapolation
from lower income groups. The direction of this bias is however not clear.
In order to allow household expenditures to react to price increases, we have to
incorporate external estimates on the price elasticities of demand. To our knowledge,
the only estimation of a full demand system based on EVS is provided by (Kohn
and Missong, 2003). We make use of their own-price elasticities, di erentiated by
six household types (Table 5) while using the mean value over all income levels.28
When simulating the tax reforms, the Engel curve estimations are used to depict
consumption reactions from changing disposable income. Afterwards, the reaction
due to prices is calculated.
28The authors were not able to identify cross-price elasticities.
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Figure A.1: Mean Expenditure shares in both data sets
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Calculation of VAT payments. In order to identify the consumption shares
of goods with di erent VAT rates, we make use of the weighting scheme applied
by the German Federal Statistical O ce for capturing price level changes (the so-
called “representative basket of products”). As an example, non-alcoholic drinks
(taxed with the standard rate) are assigned a weight of 9.3% of total expenditures
in expenditure category 1 (food and beverages). Therefore, 9.3% of this consumption
component is allotted the standard VAT rate, while the rest is taxed with the reduced
rate.
The treatment of VAT-exempted commodities for which no input tax deduc-
tion can be claimed deserves special attention. Despite their revenues being formally
exempted, it is reasonable to assume that firms shift a certain share of their input
tax burden to consumers through increased prices. The most notable case of ex-
empted goods are rents. Landlords might be able to charge higher rents in order
to compensate for taxes paid in connection to restorations or construction works.
The extent to which this occurs is however hard to estimate, as the possibility to
increase rents is restricted and depends on local market characteristics. Hence, there
is no agreement in the literature on the extent to which rents are burdened with
VAT.29 Following RWI and FiFo (2007), we assume that 11% of expenditures on
rents are subject to the standard VAT rate. This rather low assumption can be
justified in light of the overall (rather short) time horizon of our model. Similar in-
cidence assumptions are made for medical and financial services. Table A.1 depicts
the resulting VAT rate shares by consumption category.
The corresponding distribution of VAT payments is visualized in Figure A.2.
In line with other studies (OECD/Korea Institute of Public Finance, 2014), we
clearly confirm a regressive pattern of the German VAT. As income rises, the VAT
share of disposable income decreases from 12% for the first decile to 4% for decile 10,
which is below OECD average. With regard to expenditures, the pattern is rather
flat, the VAT burden ranging between 9% and 10%.
29 See RWI and FiFo (2007), Fritzsche et al. (2003) and Bach (2005).
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Table A.1: VAT Shares by Expenditure categories
Expenditure category Average Share of
Total
Expenditures
Share of
VAT 0%
(%)
Share of
VAT 7%
(%)
Share of
VAT 19%
(%)
1 Food and beverages 16.3 — 90.7 9.3
2 Alcoholic Beverages 1.3 — — 100.0
3 Tobacco 0.9 — — 100.0
4 Clothing and footwear 5.6 — — 100.0
5 Household Fuels, Energy 8.0 — 15.6 84.4
6 Rents 11.8 80.3 — 19.7
7 Household Services 2.5 — 36.2 63.8
8 Health 4.6 43.2 16.2 40.6
9 Private Transport 8.5 — — 100.0
10 Public Transport 2.5 5.0 57.0 38.0
11 Communication 3.7 — 7.4 92.6
12 Recreation and culture 11.9 9.4 33.4 57.2
13 Education 1.0 92.4 — 7.6
14 Restaurants and hotels 6.0 — 70.2 29.8
15 Other goods and services 4.7 30.6 — 69.4
16 Durable commodities 10.8 20.2 2.4 77.4
Total 100.0 17.3 27.8 55.0
Source: Own calculations.
Figure A.2: VAT incidence
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A.3 Tax-Benefit and Labor Supply Modules
We calculate household disposable income from gross income and household charac-
teristics from the SOEP data by means of a tax-benefit calculator. It reproduces the
regulations of the system of direct taxes, social security contributions and benefits in
Germany. As the latest available EVS wave is from 2008, we apply the legal status
of that year.
In the last decades, VAT has become the main source of revenue for the German
government. VAT and income tax together nowadays account for about two thirds
of total tax revenues. The personal income tax is designed progressively, with a rate
of 14% for incomes just above the basic allowance and with a top marginal rate of
42%.30 Social security contributions, in contrast, are calculated as a constant share
of labor income until an upper threshold is reached. SSC payments are, in general,
equally split between employer and employee.31 Civil servants and self-employed do
generally not contribute to the public social welfare system.
At the core of our microsimulation approach, a behavioral labor supply module
estimates preference parameters for the optimal choice between leisure time and
disposable income on the household level. The household decision is implemented
following the discrete choice household labor supply model (see Lo¨ er et al., 2014b,
for technical details on discrete choice modelling). In case of couple households,
it assumes a joint utility function for both spouses. The model is discrete in the
sense that a household n can choose between a finite number of combinations in
consumption and leisure, denoted with Jn. We restrict the choice set to seven time
categories of weekly working hours (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 hours). For households
that are flexible in their labor supply decision, this results in seven alternatives
for singles and couples with one flexible spouse.32 For couples with two flexible
spouses, the choice set expands to 49 alternatives. In addition we further expand
the choice set in order to account for an endogenous decision on whether or not
to apply for public benefits (Hoynes, 1996). This way, we address the potential
presence of welfare stigma. We specify the utility U for every choice alternative
30 In addition, a so-called solidarity surcharge is levied, amounting to 5.5% of the total income
tax burden. For earners of income above e 250,000 per year, a marginal tax rate of 45% is applied.
In 2008, capital income was taxed the same way as earnings before introducing a dual income tax
regime in 2009.
31 In 2008, the following rates apply for employees (overall): Old Age Pension Insurance: 9.95%
(19.8%); Health Insurance: 7.9% (14.9%); Unemployment Insurance: 1.65% (3.3%); Care Insur-
ance: 0.85% (1.7%).
32 Self-employed persons and civil servants are assumed inflexible in their choice of labor supply.
Even though they might adjust their labor supply, we assume that it is based their consump-
tion/leisure decision follows a di erent rationale than those of employees. Hence, we treat their
labor supply as fixed.
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j œ Jn as a function of household consumption Cnj (after subtracting consumption
taxes), leisure of the spouses Lsj , s œ {m, f} and a dummy for welfare participation
Pnj.33
U
1
Cnj, L
m
j , L
f
j , Pnj
2
= x1nj—Õ1 lnCnj + —2(lnCnj)2 + —3 lnCnj lnLmj + —4 lnCnj lnLfj
+ x2nj—Õ5 lnLmj + —6(lnLmj )2 + x3nj—Õ7 lnLfj + —8(lnLfj )2
+ ”ÕPnj + x4nj“Õ + Ánj (A.5)
Leisure follows directly from working hours, assuming a time endowment of 80 hours
per week. Disposable income for counterfactual choice categories are calculated by
keeping hourly wages constant. The vectors x1nj to x4nj capture individual and
household characteristics, such as age, number of children, handicap status and the
presence of a needy person in the household. By interacting them with leisure and
consumption, we account for observed heterogeneity.34 The parameter ” captures
welfare stigma. The vector x4nj contains dummies on part-time and full-time work.
The hence reflect market restrictions due to working hours regulations. Equation
A.5 simplifies for the case of single households, as leisure of the second person and
interactions thereof are dropped.
Under the assumption that the error term Ánj in Equation A.5 follows an
extreme value type I distribution, McFadden (1974) showed that the probability of
household n to choose alternative i over all other alternatives can be expressed as
follows:
P (Uni > Unj,’j ”= i) =
exp
1
Ï
Ë
Cni, L
f
ni, L
m
ni
È2
q
sœJn exp
1
Ï
Ë
Cns, L
f
ns, Lmns
È2 (A.6)
The term Ï captures the observed part of the utility function A.5. The structural
utility parameters can be obtained by estimating equation A.6 via maximum like-
lihood. Results are given in Table A.2. Based on these estimates, the individual
reactions following a change in households’ net income can be simulated. This is
done by predicting the choice probabilities for each working time category under the
old and the new regime. Labor supply for each household is then obtained by mul-
tiplying predicted probabilities with the respective amount of hours. The presented
reform e ects should thus be interpreted as an expected value of supplied hours. A
similar logic applies to income amounts. The simulated labor supply elasticities are
33As Lo¨ er et al. (2014b) demonstrate, the type of utility function is of minor importance for
the implied elasticity of labor supply.
34We assume the coe cients —1 to —8 to be fixed. Assuming some of these to be random
would allow for unobserved heterogeneity, but this is particularly more burdensome in terms of
computation.
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in line with extant micro-based literature and range from 0.1 for single men to 0.3
for women in couples (see Table 4 in (Lo¨ er et al., 2014a)).
Table A.2: Estimates of structural labor supply model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SingleM SingleF CoupleM CoupleF CoupleMF
C -5.725úúú -2.607 3.512ú -1.907 2.391ú
(1.360) (1.460) (1.451) (1.564) (1.037)
C2 0.199úúú 0.197úúú 0.172úúú 0.118ú 0.221úúú
(0.0290) (0.0303) (0.0399) (0.0516) (0.0165)
C◊
Agem 0.0413 0.0475 0.0866ú
(0.0291) (0.0580) (0.0348)
Age2m -0.000516 -0.000351 -0.00103úú
(0.000337) (0.000744) (0.000371)
Handcm -0.100 0.789 0.208
(0.116) (1.354) (0.242)
Agef 0.0958ú 0.214ú -0.0336
(0.0396) (0.105) (0.0386)
Age2f -0.00112ú -0.00251ú 0.000464
(0.000480) (0.00126) (0.000434)
Handcf -0.322ú -0.359 0.0612
(0.161) (0.399) (0.200)
Care -0.301 -0.745 -0.0971
(0.231) (0.417) (0.159)
Child Æ 2y 0.441 0.0448 0.217
(1.020) (1.581) (0.260)
Child 3–6y 0.132 -0.138 -0.0403
(0.369) (1.066) (0.138)
Child 7–16y 0.376 0.826 -0.00863
(0.217) (0.570) (0.0730)
C ◊ L1 0.943úúú -0.00331 -1.274úúú -0.522ú -0.894úúú
(0.246) (0.272) (0.233) (0.205) (0.125)
L1 18.96úúú 23.20úúú 55.75úúú 22.64úúú 47.04úúú
(4.312) (4.456) (4.862) (3.542) (2.641)
(L1)2 -3.095úúú -2.073úúú -6.586úúú -1.884úúú -5.452úúú
(0.459) (0.396) (0.597) (0.356) (0.261)
L1◊
Agem -0.241úú -0.0361 -0.205úúú
(0.0773) (0.0868) (0.0451)
Age2m 0.00297úú 0.000845 0.00262úúú
(0.000929) (0.00100) (0.000518)
Handcm 1.844úúú 0.683 0.508
(0.458) (1.046) (0.314)
Agef -0.424úúú -0.269úú
(0.0837) (0.0932)
Age2f 0.00582úúú 0.00396úúú
(0.00103) (0.00108)
Handcf -0.103 0.365
(0.544) (0.555)
Care 4.369úú -0.170
(1.342) (0.623)
Child Æ 2y 2.393 1.421
(1.239) (0.900)
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Child 3–6y 2.166úúú 2.008úúú
(0.489) (0.568)
Child 7–16y 1.353úúú 1.118úúú
(0.240) (0.246)
C ◊ L2 -0.192
(0.147)
L2 18.16úúú
(2.657)
(L2)2 -1.899úúú
(0.221)
L2◊
Agef -0.221úúú
(0.0518)
Age2f 0.00352úúú
(0.000632)
Handcf 0.434
(0.393)
Care 1.433úú
(0.487)
Child Æ 2y 3.380úúú
(0.394)
Child 3–6y 1.694úúú
(0.188)
Child 7–16y 1.148úúú
(0.0935)
L1 ◊ L2 0.451ú
(0.181)
Dummy Variables
Workm -4.460úúú -6.851úúú -5.773úúú
(0.380) (0.586) (0.239)
Parttimem 0.135 0.834ú 0.199
(0.260) (0.418) (0.190)
Fulltimem 0.928úúú 1.148úúú 1.145úúú
(0.0946) (0.116) (0.0510)
Benefit Takeup -1.052úúú -0.992úúú -1.789úúú -1.448úúú -1.619úúú
(0.186) (0.114) (0.215) (0.230) (0.0928)
Workf -1.292úúú -1.259úúú -1.039úúú
(0.186) (0.153) (0.0849)
Parttimef -0.0593 0.370úúú -0.0177
(0.117) (0.0975) (0.0593)
Fulltimef 0.968úúú 0.704úúú 0.806úúú
(0.0842) (0.101) (0.0574)
N 8237 12133 6405 8397 205897
AIC 2707.9 4249.2 2225.9 4001.8 21022.9
Own estimations with IZA MOD v.3.0.4based on SOEP 2009. Standard errors in parentheses ú (p<0.05),
úú (p<0.01), úúú (p<0.001). Columns (3) and (4) encompass men and women respectively with a non-
flexible spouse (due to retirement, self-employment or disability). The choice contains 7 choices for weekly
hours in the first 4 columns, and 49 choices in the last column. The choice set is further expanded to
allow for endogeneity of benefit take-up. L1 and L2 indicate leisure of the first and the second adult
in the household respectively. Handicap indicates a handicap degree Ø 50. Care indicates the presence
of a person in need of care in the household. Household utility is specified as translog (Equation A.5.).
AIC = Akaike Information Criterion.
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